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Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: 
A Modest Response to Masur and Posner 
 
David M. Driesen 
 
 Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner’s article, Against Feasibility Analysis,1 shows 
that the question of whether we should analyze regulation’s feasibility raises intriguing 
issues.  One way of framing the core normative issue underlying feasibility-based 
regulation is to ask a seemingly simple question:  Suppose we could save a single person 
from a painful death from cancer by demanding that an industry pay $10 million to 
reduce exposure to a carcinogen at the work place.  Should we do so?   
 
 The answer to this question depends on the cost’s distribution and one’s 
normative commitments.  Suppose, for example, that imposing this $10 million cost 
causes an industry selling 1 million television sets a year to raise prices by 10 dollars per 
set.  One should consider this $10 million cost insignificant because of its distribution 
and enact this regulation.  This is an example of feasible regulation.  Suppose, however, 
that the $10 million cost causes much of the industry to shut down, creating 
unemployment for 10,000 workers.  One might respond to this case in one of two ways 
depending on one’s normative commitments.  One could assert the primacy of human life 
and insist that this regulation is appropriate, a philosophy seen, to some extent, in health-
based standard setting provisions.2  Alternatively, one could say that an administrative 
agency should eschew this regulation as infeasible, since the industry cannot implement 
technological changes to save our cancer victim.3  Since the industry could meet a fully 
health protective goal by shutting down,4 the decision to insist on only feasible regulation 
rests primarily on a normative judgment that an administrative agency ought not routinely 
impose the drastic consequence of permanent unemployment upon many workers.5  My 
rather modest claim is that both responses are rational.   
 
This claim supports the feasibility principle, the idea that administrative agencies 
should regulate serious health and environmental hazards as stringently as possible 
without causing widespread plant shutdowns, not as a perfect ideal for regulation, but as a 
rational norm among several plausible ones.6  Although one can make the claim against 
the feasibility principle stronger by altering my television example, I will show that these 
changes do not make the demand for feasibility irrational.  Moreover, even if one rejects 
the feasibility principle, feasibility analysis will provide useful information, because it 
                                                 
1 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-471 (2001) (explaining that EPA must set 
national ambient air quality standards protecting public health regardless of costs). 
3  See generally American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-509 (1981) (defining feasible 
regulation as that which is “capable of being done”).   
4 See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 264, 265 n.14 (1976). 
5 See David Driesen, Distributing the Cost of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection:  The 
Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL.  1, 34-38 (2005) 
(explaining why it is reasonable to eschew regulations producing widespread job loss).   
6 See id. at 2-3 (defining the feasibility principle as a “preference for avoiding widespread plant shutdowns” 
while otherwise maximizing emission reductions). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664567
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identifies regulations distributing costs in atypical ways that produce widespread job 
losses, a consequence that may be comparable in importance to the serious harms to 
health that regulation prevents. 
 
 Masur and Posner argue that feasibility analysis lacks any normative justification, 
since it leads to under and over-regulation.7  They supplement this normative argument 
with two case studies that reveal various practical difficulties in carrying out feasibility 
analysis.8  The case studies and normative argument together create the impression that 
feasibility analysis is normatively bankrupt and leads to arbitrary regulation.  Their 
analysis responds to my previous article, Distributing the Cost of Environmental Health, 
and Safety Regulation:  The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory 
Reform,9 [hereinafter Feasibility], which argued that the feasibility principle reasonably 
addresses concerns about the distribution of costs and benefits and that feasibility 
analysis offers significant practical advantages over cost-benefit analysis (CBA).    
 
 Their normative argument assumes what they try to prove.  They define under-
regulation primarily as regulation where benefits exceed costs and over-regulation as 
regulation where costs exceed benefits,10 thereby resting their attack on feasibility on 
assumptions about CBA’s superiority.  Of course, if efficient regulation is better than 
feasible regulation, then it follows that their conclusions about under and over-regulation 
are correct.  But nowhere do they grapple with the question that the television 
hypothetical highlights: Is the equation of aggregate costs and benefits at the margin the 
proper ideal for regulation?  In spite of Masur and Posner’s promise to “uncover” the 
normative commitments underlying feasibility analysis,11 they ultimately fail to confront 
the key normative arguments about wide distribution of regulatory costs to consumers 
rendering even high aggregate cost’s impacts on each individual trivial or about the 
nature of the experience of job loss.  Accordingly, most of this response will focus on 
clarifying the normative case for feasibility analysis.   
  
 Their neglect of key normative arguments stems in part from a preoccupation with 
flaws the practice of feasibility analysis.12  I agree with Masur and Posner’s 
characterization of that practice as less than wholly satisfactory and suggested as much in 
Feasibility.13  But their conclusion that the practical flaws justify rejecting feasibility 
analysis in favor of CBA depends heavily upon comparing flawed real world feasibility 
analysis to an idealized and utterly unrealistic portrait of CBA.  It is easy to show that all 
of the significant flaws they associate with feasibility analysis exist in CBA and that CBA 
                                                 
7 Masur & Posner, supra note 1 at 657 (finding that feasibility analysis “leads to both under- and 
overregulation). 
8 See id. at 670-87. 
9 Driesen, supra note 5.   
10 Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 697-98 (defining overregulation and underregulation as deviations from 
economic optimality and criticizing feasibility analysis for promoting such deviations). 
11 See id. at 661. 
12 See id. at 675-81, 684-87 (discussing various anomalies and incomplete explanations in one OSHA and 
one EPA rulemaking). 
13 Driesen, supra note 5, at 19-22 (referring to the “vagaries of implementation” and suggesting that 
agencies have not consistently adhered to the feasibility principle). 
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maximizes decision costs.  Although Masur and Posner deserve praise for their effort to 
delve into the details of some case studies, their analysis assumes too glibly that every 
anomaly they see arises only under feasibility analysis and has nothing to do with CBA.   
 
 The core practical argument offered here, that technical problems Masur and 
Posner find in feasibility analysis also infect CBA, has not been explicitly made before.  
Normatively, this article includes a new argument showing that the lack of correlation 
between consumption and happiness supports the feasibility principle.   
 
 The analysis offered in this reply has broad implications for the regulatory reform 
debate:  Maximizing the number of variables that an agency considers does not lower 
decision-making costs or clarify normative commitments.  Instead, it increases the 
complexity of analysis and minimizes clarity.  Any attempt to clarify normative 
commitments and reduce decision costs by limiting the number of variables considered 
will, by making some normative choice, leave other plausible normative choices out.     
 
 Part I of this article develops a little vocabulary that will help clarify the debate 
and provides a brief summary of their position exposing some of the vagueness at the 
heart of their normative argument.  Part II shows that significant normative arguments 
support feasibility analysis’ focus on job loss, even if it does not focus on it perfectly. 
Part III shows that CBA suffers from the same practical defects that they find in 
feasibility analysis.  Finally, Part IV puts this debate in institutional context and defends 
the feasibility principle as reasonable, in spite of the validity of some of their criticisms.    
 
I.  Analysis, Criterion, and Norms 
 
A.  Feasibility Analysis and the Feasibility Principle 
 
Feasibility analysis focuses on the question of whether a regulated industry 
possesses the capacity to make a significant health or environmental improvement.14  It 
evaluates technologies (defined broadly to include a variety of techniques, including 
pollution prevention) that might make the improvement possible.15  It also compares the 
costs of these technologies to the facility owners’ financial capabilities or the profits 
associated with particular facilities to evaluate whether establishing a particular pollution 
reduction requirement would produce shutdowns of facilities rather than desired 
technological changes.16  This analysis would be necessary, however awkward and 
                                                 
14 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981) (defining feasibility in terms 
of what one is capable of doing). 
15 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 981 (11th Cir. 1992) (evaluating an agency claim that 
“existing engineering controls are available” to meet OSHA standards for air contaminants);FMC Corp. v. 
Train, 539 F.2d 973, 982 (4th Cir. 1976) (reviewing an EPA conclusion that technology is available when 
EPA has test results from only a single plant); National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(providing detailed review of EPA’s claim that existing technologies made limits on air pollutants from 
lime kilns achievable). 
16 See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496-501 (2004); NRDC v. EPA, 
863 F.2d 1420, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 297 (3d Cir. 1977) 
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conceptually difficult, for any regulatory decision that treated plant closings and 
associated job loss as potentially relevant.     
 
 In practice, government agencies often carry out feasibility analysis to inform 
decisions about what level of protection the best available technology can achieve.  I 
have argued for understanding requirements to base standards on the best available 
technology (and similar expressions found in various environmental, health, and safety 
statutes) as a presumptive demand to maximize environmental protection up until the 
point where “widespread plant shutdowns” occur.17  I refer to the normative principle that 
government agencies should maximize protection from serious environmental or health 
hazards up to the point where widespread plant closings occur as the “feasibility 
principle.”18   
 
 B. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Cost-Benefit Criteria 
    
 CBA seeks to delineate the costs and benefits of a regulation reducing harms to 
health and the environment.  One can think of costs as simply the dollar amount that 
industry must pay to implement technological improvements necessary to reduce 
environmental or occupational harms.19  Or one can think of them as a very broad 
assessment of the consequences of imposing those costs.20  If one means for CBA to 
include the latter, then it includes feasibility analysis.  Let us refer to the first type of 
CBA as “narrow” CBA and the second as “broad” CBA.   
 
 Regulations’ benefits consist largely of diminished harm to health and the 
environment, such as the life saved from cancer in my example.21  CBA requires the 
regulator to estimate the number of lives saved, the number and type of serious illnesses 
avoided, and the extent of ecological damage ameliorated, among other things, through 
quantitative risk assessment.22  Scholars agree that regulators cannot quantify many 
significant effects, and Masur and Posner’s case studies exemplify that.23  Furthermore, 
where quantification proves possible, it requires a set of fairly arbitrary assumptions to 
extrapolate from limited data.24  The analyst must then convert the quantified benefits 
                                                 
17 See Driesen, supra note 5, at 9. 
18 Id. 
19 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless:  Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental 
Protection, 150 PENN. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2002) (describing cost estimation in these terms and 
characterizing it as “straightforward” in theory).   
20 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2002) (defining 
CBA as a “full” qualitative and quantitative “accounting of the consequences of an action.”). 
21 See Driesen, supra note 5, at 51. 
22 See id.; Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (1998) (describing CBA as 
beginning with quantitative risk assessment). 
23 See Id. at 13 (describing the lack of testing vehicles for ecological or health risks); Masur & Posner, 
supra note 1, at 671, 674, 682 (discussing the agencies’ inability to quantify non-cancer health risks in the 
rules they used for their case studies); Ellen K. Silbergeld, This Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L. J. 405, 413-14 (1995). 
24 Oliver A. Houck, Of BAT, Birds, and B-A-T:  The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. 
L. REV. 403, 415 (1994) (describing the process of estimating risks to human’s based on animal studies as 
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into dollar amounts in order to facilitate comparison of costs and benefits and figure out 
what to do about the nonquantified benefits.25   
 
 Monetization, the conversion of risk assessment numbers to dollar values, 
requires controversial assumptions, as Masur and Posner seem to acknowledge.26  
Regulatory agencies employing CBA would likely find a single death from cancer of less 
value than a $10 million compliance expenditure, because they derive the value of life 
from controversial estimates of “risk premiums” reflecting differentials between the 
wages workers are willing to accept in high risk occupations and the wages they are 
willing to accept in certain low risk occupations.27  Risk premium studies produce a wide 
range of values, but $10 million is above the range regulatory agencies typically 
employ.28  
 
 The decision about what action to take after completing a CBA depends upon a 
criterion for regulation.29  The economically correct criterion is that costs should match 
benefits at the margin.30  Call this the “efficiency criterion.” Employing this criterion, the 
$10 million expenditure clearly exceeds the benefit of saving one life under standard 
assumptions.  Cass Sunstein, the current head of the Office of Information of Regulatory 
Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and many others instead favor  
a more flexible rule that costs should not grossly exceed benefits.31  Call this the 
“proportionality criterion.”  Under this criterion, a regulator must make an arbitrary 
decision about whether the $10 million regulation grossly exceeds the benefit of saving 
one life or just modestly exceeds that benefit.  A third criterion simply requires that 
                                                                                                                                                 
involving “more guesswork than a television game show”); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming 
Environmental Law:  A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 572 
(1992) (noting that the National Academy of Sciences has identified fifty “inference options” where a 
policy decision must be made to create a risk assessment from limited data); Wendy E. Wagner, The 
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (1995) (discussing the problem 
of extrapolating estimates of human health effects from high-dose animal experiments).  
25 Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2001) 
(explaining that CBA reduces the advantages and disadvantages of a decision to a “numerical metric”). 
26 Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 701 (noting that CBA’s critics find CBA arbitrary and describing the 
question of how to value avoided deaths as a “vexed question.”). 
27 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:  ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND 
THE VALUE OF NOTHING 75-76, 83 (2004) (describing the risk premium methodology and presenting the 
values agencies obtain from them). 
28 See ID. at 80-84 (describing some the disparate values obtained in studies of risk premiums and 
suggesting that the numbers chosen appear arbitrary and certainly vary among agencies).   
29 See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 387 (2006) (pointing 
out that a cost-benefit criterion should influence the stringency of standards in theoretically predictable 
ways). 
30 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23 (1975) 
(describing charging a price equal to the social costs as correcting a misallocation of resources); 1 
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:  ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSES 253-54 (Karl-Goran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds. 2003) (defining a socially optimum 
regulation or tax as one the equates marginal abatement cost to marginal damage); HORST SIEBERT, 
ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT:  THEORY AND POLICY 65 (5th rev. ed. 1998) (defining maximizing net 
benefits as marginal costs equaling marginal benefits). 
31 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON:  SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 119-120 (2002). 
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benefits must exceed costs.32  Call this the “no excess cost criterion.”33  My hypothetical 
violates the no excess cost criterion,” but a large number of laxer regulations may satisfy 
it. 
 
 C.  Masur amd Posner’s Analysis 
      
In Feasibility, I developed a concentration principle:  Widely distributed costs 
almost always have minor effects, while concentrated costs (or harms, if you’d prefer) 
can have devastating impacts.34  Environmental insults often visit serious harms on some 
unfortunate individuals, such as cancer, neurological disorders, or exacerbated asthma, 
while leaving other relatively untouched.35  By contrast, firms usually disperse 
regulation’s cost widely among consumers, thereby produce a de minimis effect.36 In 
cases where regulations might produce widespread plant closures, however, the costs 
have importance comparable to serious harms to public health, since plant closures 
concentrate costs’ effects on a discrete group of workers.37   I argued that this 
concentration principle justifies maximizing reductions up to the point where plant 
closures become widespread.38   
 
Masur and Posner, as I indicated, argue that “feasibility analysis” lacks any 
normative justification.  Analysis does not require normative justification, as an analysis 
is not a decision or principle, so this argument should be understood as an attack on the 
feasibility principle.  They argue that the feasibility principle both permits regulation 
when costs exceed benefits and forbids regulation in cases where benefits exceed costs.  
Thus, they implicitly argue that some sort of cost-benefit test must govern regulation and 
that anything else is normatively bankrupt. 
 
 Masur and Posner’s defense of this assertion has significant gaps because of their 
failure to distinguish between analysis and criterion and to be clear about the criterion 
they are employing in imagining that an efficiency criterion must be normatively superior 
and analytically clearer than the feasibility principle.  At the outset, they explicitly 
embrace the no excess cost criterion.39  Later, however, they criticize OSHA for not 
selecting the option that might assure the greatest “net benefits” under one of several 
possible sets of assumptions.40  But an option with greatest net benefits is just one of 
many options a regulator could choose under a no excess cost criterion.  Their 
endorsement of maximization of net benefits implies a different normative criterion than 
the one they explicitly endorse, namely the efficiency criterion.  In fairness, Against 
                                                 
32 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 1288 (1980-1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) 
(requiring that, to the extent permitted by law, the costs of regulation not exceed its benefits). 
33 See Driesen, supra note 29, at 387-90 (discussing this “no excess cost requirement”). 
34 See Driesen, supra note 5, at 35. 
35 Id. at 38. 
36 See id. at 36-38 (supporting this point). 
37 See id. at 37 (explaining this point). 
38 Id. at 41. 
39 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 657 (claiming that “a regulation satisfies CBA if it produces 
benefits . . . greater than the cost of compliance.”) 
40 Id. at 679-680. 
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Feasibility Analysis relies on a concept of “overall well-being”, which Eric Posner 
developed in his work with Matthew Adler, as a framework for resolving CBA’s 
normative difficulties.41  Against Feasibility Analysis, however, does not show how such 
an abstract moral philosophical concept would resolve the issues posed by hypothetical 
$10 million regulations of carcinogens from television manufacturing or any other case.  
The failure to consistently specify a cost-benefit criterion allows them to attack a fairly 
clear feasibility principle without assuming the difficult burden of defending a reasonably 
clear alternative criterion, such as the efficiency criterion.   
 
 They also suggest that the feasibility principle’s focus on job loss has no 
normative justification.  They point out that job loss from an economist’s perspective is 
inconsequential, since it does not necessarily impact consumer welfare.42  They also 
attack feasibility analysis for neglecting other regulatory costs, thereby leaving out 
consideration of regulation’s impact on other aspects of welfare, such as entertainment, 
food consumption, transportation, and the costs of raising children.43   
 
 In spite of their doubts about job loss’ relevance, Masur and Posner leave open 
the possibility that CBA might take job loss into account (i.e. that they endorse broad 
CBA).44  If it does, (and it certainly seems relevant to overall well-being) then it would 
have to include a feasibility analysis with all of its difficulties. 
 
 Against Feasibility Analysis contains a vast array of technical objections to 
feasibility analysis. Masur and Posner point out that government agencies must define the 
industry regulated for purposes of creating any particular regulation, and that they can 
manipulate the outcome of a feasibility analysis by manipulating the industry definition.45  
They also criticize feasibility analysis for its focus on available technology, rather than on 
technology forcing.46  This focus, they say, leaves regulators with a choice between 
banning pollutants and using “available” technologies, which may have significant 
limitations.47 Finally, they articulate a number of concerns about how to determine 
whether regulations are economically feasible.  The most fundamental objection to the 
feasibility principle made in this context involves a claim that plant shutdowns may not 
signify job loss, as workers might be transferred.48  This argument is conceptually 
important, because it attempts to sever the link between the feasibility principle’s focus 
on plant shutdowns and its normative justification rooted in concern about job loss.  They 
also point out that job losses can occur outside the plant shutdown context.49  They 
                                                 
41 See MATTHEW D. ADLER AND ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006). 
42 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1 at 704-05. 
43 See id. at 704.  
44 See id. at 705 (“if it’s appropriate to take into account the hardship costs to workers who lose their jobs-
then cost-benefit analysis can easily accommodate these costs.”)  
45 See id. at 688-91. 
46 See id. at 691-93. 
47 See id. at 692 (claiming that agencies employing a feasibility principle “must choose between mandating 
safety precautions that already exist and banning the substance altogether”).  
48 See id. at 695 (stating that plant closures “could have no effect on job losses if firms just reassign 
workers” to open plants). 
49 See id. (pointing out that regulations could “cause firms to fire workers while keeping plants open”) 
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therefore urge that agencies, if job loss is a concern, should measure job losses “directly” 
rather than through an analysis of likely plant closures.50  They also argue that problems 
of “path dependence” and “time inconsistency” arise under the feasibility principle, since 
the economic feasibility of a proposed regulatory requirement can depend on how much 
regulatory cost regulated firms already bear under prior regulation.51  
 
 They infer from their technical analysis that CBA provides clearer guidance than 
the feasibility principle.52  They also suggest that CBA generates lower decision costs 
than feasibility analysis by asserting that “cost-benefit analysis minimizes decision costs 
through the magic of quantification.”53 Thus, their argument recognizes that finding 
technical flaws in feasibility analysis does not suffice; rather they must show that these 
flaws create more significant problems than those arising under available analytical 
alternatives.          
   
II. A Normative Case for the Feasibility Principle 
 
Although Masur and Posner identify me as the “leading defender of feasibility 
analysis,”54 they oddly overlook many of the arguments I made for such analysis in a 
review of Eric Posner’s recent book with Matthew Adler, New Foundations of Cost-
Benefit Analysis.55  Loss of work constitutes a crisis for many people for reasons well 
recognized by moral philosophers, economists, and psychologists.  Martha Nussbaum 
and many others have argued, with strong empirical support, that affiliation with others, 
avoidance of emotional loss, and a feeling of control over one’s environment constitute 
critical aspects of well-being.56  Job loss, as I have explained, implicates all of these 
dimensions.57  Most people develop a set of stable relationships with their colleagues and 
derive some of their sense of identity from their place of employment.  If they are fired, 
they suddenly lose a set of vital affiliations.  They experience a profound emotional loss.  
Losing a job involuntarily is a shock.58  Moreover, in a reasonably stable work situation 
people feel that they have some control over their environment.  Most employees believe 
that working hard can allow them to hold onto their jobs, and many may believe that 
their efforts make advancement likely.  Although workers do not have complete control 
over their employment, they often feel that they have some influence over the 
environment that surrounds them for 40 hours or more a week.  Being fired destroys the 
feeling that one has some control over one’s environment and makes workers feel that 
                                                 
50 Id. at 696. 
51 See id. at 696-97. 
52 See id. at 705-707 (arguing that CBA’s “ambiguities can be resolved” by keeping its proper purpose in 
mind, but that feasibility is “indefinite” and arbitrary”).  
53 See id. at 700. 
54 Id.  
55 (2006).  See Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar, and David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis:  New 
Foundations on Shifting Sands, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48 (2009).   
56 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 41, at 74-75. 
57 See Sinden, Kysar, & Driesen, supra note 55, at 65. 
58 Michael Luo & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Reveals Depth and Trauma of Joblessness in U.S.:  Emotional 
Havoc Wreaked on Workers and Family, N.Y. TIMES A1 (December 15, 2009) (describing job loss as 
causing “financial and emotional havoc”). 
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they are at the mercy of larger forces that they are powerless to effect.  As one worker 
fired during the recent financial crisis put it: 
 
We grow up with the impression there’s a correlation between effort and the fruits 
of your labor.  To be honest with you, I have very little confidence I’m going to 
able to turn this around.  It just feels completely out of my control.59 
 
Thus, job loss involves an injury that dollar estimates of costs do not measure.   
 
Ironically, CBA proponents have made even more of the job loss’ importance.  
They link job loss potentially resulting from costly regulation to suicide, and therefore 
argue that costs have health impacts comparable in importance to the benefits counted in 
CBA.60  Although CBA cannot predict the suicide rate among those losing jobs or 
measure the intensity of other emotional or health losses, feasibility analysis implicitly 
gives weight to these consequences.     
 
Masur and Posner rather breezily suggest that job loss is only important if it 
proves permanent.61  But all of these consequences can occur whether the job loss is 
permanent or not.  Indeed, studies show that job loss produces a decrease in the 
terminated’s feeling of well-being even after employment resumes.62  Moreover, a 
temporary loss of employment for a year or two can deliver quite a blow to a family 
trying to build savings to pay for college and support children well.  And displaced 
workers experience this as a financial loss not merely as a lack of opportunity to 
purchase more things.63  The economics literature recognizes that people experience 
losses of what they already have more keenly than the disappearance of an opportunity 
for gain.64    
 
Of course, blue collar industries have shed a lot of permanent jobs in recent 
years.65  Happily, environmental regulation on the whole has modestly increased 
employment, perhaps because of the feasibility principle’s influence.66  But if 
                                                 
59 Michael Luo, For Many, Uncertainty, Fear and Shame Often Follow Pink Slips, N.Y. TIMES A26 
(December 15, 2009).  
60 Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination 
Law, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the Rational Actor, 51 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 
183, 215 & n. 125 (2009) (summarizing results of studies of unemployment’s affect on  mental and 
physical health).  
61 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 704 (stating the cost of job loss to workers “if there is one, is 
transitional only”). 
62 Moss & Huang, supra note 60, at 214-16 (discussing findings that unemployment causes permanent 
emotional “scarring”, creating insecurity that “decreases happiness”). 
63 See id. at 205 (explaining that because of the endowment effect, a terminated employee “suffers a greater 
loss than somebody . . . not hired”) (emphasis omitted). 
64 See id. at 205-14 (reviewing evidence of the endowment effect). 
65 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 85  (stating that overall industrial employment has 
fallen since the 1970s) 
66 See EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
171 (1999) (stating that environmental protection supports blue collar jobs); Richard D. Morgenstern et al., 
Jobs Versus the Environment:  An Industry-Level Perspective, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 412 (2002).  Cf. 
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government regulators start producing a lot of infeasible regulation, we may expect more 
job loss.    
 
Because job loss constitutes such a heavy blow, it may make sense to allow 
relatively lax regulation of an industry contributing to serious damage to the environment 
or public health to avoid widespread plant closings from strict regulation.  While this 
outcome appears troubling, so does the alternative of widespread plant shutdowns.  
Many health and environmental problems that regulation addresses are cumulative, the 
result of lots of industries’ activities.  In these cases, when regulation of one contributing 
industry becomes lax because of strict regulation’s infeasibility, regulators can often 
make up for it with strict regulation of industries that can afford the cost.   
 
By contrast, it makes no sense to give even large costs any weight if regulated 
parties will disperse those costs widely so as not to seriously harm any individual (as in  
the television price increase example).  Proposed environmental regulations not 
producing widespread plant closures generally lead to agency predictions of modest price 
increases.  Prices go up and down all of the time in our economy and for the most part 
people adjust, often without noticing the impact.  Costs having no discernable impact on 
individuals would not significantly affect “overall well-being,” the moral philosophical 
underpinning of Masur and Posner’s critique.  Moreover, predicted price rises often fail 
to materialize, because producers innovate in ways that bring down the prices that might 
otherwise have risen because of regulation.67  Many opportunities for price-rise avoiding 
innovation can arise, because not only innovation in environmental technology, but also 
any innovation in process, materials use or extraction, or labor organization that reduces 
cost can make up for a price increase stemming from regulation. Even if some 
consequences exist, when costs are widely distributed, they simply deserve no weight 
compared to the concentrated harms that individual victims of pollution experience, such 
as hospitalization for asthma or death from cancer.   
 
I pointed out in Feasibility that most regulations distribute costs quite widely.68  
There is a big difference between a regulation raising television prices by $10 per set and 
a regulation of identical total costs that shuts down facilities employing thousands of 
people.  Treating the two the same, as CBA usually does, is arbitrary.    
 
I do not deny that entertainment, food consumption, transportation, or the costs of 
raising children matter.69  My argument is that the likelihood of any particular regulation 
having a significant impact on these things is so low, because firms distribute costs so 
                                                                                                                                                 
Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 704-05 (claiming, incorrectly, that economists “traditionally ignored the 
effect of regulation on employment”). 
67 See Nicholas A. Ashford, Compliance Costs:  The Neglected Issue, in MAGAZINE OF THE EUROPEAN 
AGENCY FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK, 30-33 (1999) (arguing that innovation in response to 
stringent OSHA regulation led to reduced costs); David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage 
Innovation?, 33 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,094, 10,103-04 (2003) (providing detailed examples of 
innovative responses to stringent regulation). 
68 See Driesen, supra note 5, at 36 (explaining why costs tend to be distributed widely and citing examples). 
69 Cf. Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 704 (criticizing the feasibility test for ignoring these sorts of 
things). 
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widely, often compete with less regulated firms, and employ cost saving innovation from 
time to time, that agencies can safely choose to ignore them, when the alternative 
involves the extraordinarily burdensome and controversial procedure of quantifying costs 
and benefits.70  Masur and Posner duck, rather than address, my argument that widely 
distributed costs have de minimis impacts on consumers when they criticize feasibility 
analysis’ neglect of consumer welfare.  Retrospective analysis of entire regulatory 
programs (not individual regulations) to evaluate actual (rather than predicted) 
cumulative costs, however, may usefully inform major legislative decisions.   
 
Furthermore, I am not aware of a single CBA that takes any of the impacts of 
rules on any of these welfare effects into account.  Instead, a CBA typically focuses on 
the dollar costs of implementing technological changes and does not distinguish between 
regulation influencing food prices and regulation raising the cost of an entertainment 
option.  Feasibility analysis offers the advantage of reflecting elected representatives’ 
qualitative judgment about what is important.   
   
 The television example highlights another problem with Masur and Posner’s 
assumption that CBA advances overall well-being.  People spend money according to 
their preferences, but, as Posner has pointed out repeatedly (along with Matthew Adler), 
their preferences can be either welfare decreasing or welfare enhancing.71  Loss of an 
opportunity to buy a television provides an example of a debatable case.  Perhaps losing 
television provides a benefit, freeing people addicted to television for pursuits creating 
more long-term satisfaction.  Perhaps not.  But money saved from reducing regulatory 
costs might be spent on something as important as life saving surgery or as detrimental 
as addictive recreational drugs.  Hence, there are still more grounds for being dubious 
about CBA’s connection to overall well-being.  By contrast, we know that health 
impairment and job loss usually constitute serious setbacks for people, substantially 
impairing welfare.  
 
 A broader point about value may further account for some of the differences 
between my normative perspective and that of Masur and Posner.  Masur and Posner 
have, perhaps reflexively, adopted the economists’ habit of focusing exclusively on 
consumer welfare.72  This focus on consumer welfare proves extremely useful for 
economic modeling employed to describe a well functioning market.  But if one is 
interested, as Masur and Posner are, in overall well-being, a focus on consumption 
proves odd.  We have little evidence that increased consumption breeds happiness.  
Therefore, people’s preferences in the purchase of consumer goods (as opposed to vital 
things like employment and health) may weakly correlate with their well-being.  This 
critique has been advanced in the economics literature at least since John Kenneth 
                                                 
70 Driesen, supra note 5, at 36 (discussing cost spreading and avoidanceand citing illustrative examples, 
which are typical of many cases studied in preparing Feasibility).   
71 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 41, at 33-34 (describing the problem of “nonideal” preferences). 
72 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 704-05 (sympathetically explaining that economists “traditionally 
ignored the effect of regulation on employment,” because they are transitory and considered “small relative 
to the benefits and costs to consumers”). 
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Galbraith’s work in the 1950s.73  The psychological literature shows that well-being 
depends upon one’s health and affiliations with family, friends and colleagues at work, 
but tends to refute the idea that more consumption, beyond a certain minimum, generally 
increases welfare.74  In other words, people derive their most important satisfactions (and 
dissatisfactions) not from their consumption, but from their work and their families.   
 
 That said, the emphasis on plant shutdowns takes consumer welfare seriously 
where it most likely merits attention.  Although regulation almost always produces (or is 
modeled to produce) minor price rises having little effect even on preference satisfaction, 
plant shutdowns may signal a more serious disruption of markets.  If regulation bankrupts 
an entire industry, then a good may disappear altogether.  And if regulation bankrupts a 
significant segment of an industry, it may lessen competition and therefore stimulate 
price increases greater than and longer lasting than those typically associated with 
regulation, even though economists probably cannot reliably predict the extent of a 
changed market structure’s effect on prices. 
 
In a pure free market treating price increases, even small ones, as a minor matter 
would occasionally prove erroneous.  Suppose, for example, that a small price increase 
applied to a life saving medicine made it impossible for a poor person to pay for it.  If we 
had a complete laissez-faire market, this sort of thing could kill somebody.  Fortunately, 
however, for essential goods we have safety nets; food stamps, health insurance, and 
state programs to help the poor with heating bills.  If safety nets become full of holes, we 
should mend them.  For all kinds of things have the capacity to make essential goods or 
services become too expensive; taxes, patents and other forms of monopoly power, raw 
material shortages, unanticipated demand, and runaway executive compensation come 
immediately to mind.75  Many of these factors dwarf regulation in their significance.  
Once one concedes, as the information at hand should lead one to do, that the typical 
impact of regulation is minor price increases, the dramatic example of a marginal case 
for an essential good probably should not drive policy at all, and certainly not for most 
cases. 
  
                                                 
73 See E. Diener and R. Biswas Diener, Will Money Increase Subjective Well Being:  A Literature Review 
and Guide to Needed Research, 57 SOC. INDIC. RES. 119 (2002); R. Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes of 
All Increase the Happiness of All, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 35 (1995); RH FRANK, LUXURY FEVER:  WHY 
MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF SUCCESS 6 (1999) (after a certain threshold has been reach 
increases in material wealth do not correlate with increases in subjective well-being) JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 131, 145 (1960) (questioning the link between increased production 
and consumption and increased welfare). 
74 See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1093, 1119-1121 (2009) (finding that physical health and social relationships are much stronger predictors 
of “life satisfaction” than home ownership); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 
655 (2007) (explaining that friendship generates self-esteem, which is critical to happiness and avoidance of 
depression); Norval D. Glenn & Charles N. Weaver, The Contribution of Marital Happiness to Global 
Happiness, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 161, 163-64 (1981).  Cf. L. van Boven & T. Gilovich, To do or to 
Have?  That is the Question, 85 J. PERS. SOC PSYCHOL. 1193 (2003) (finding that experiences rather than 
possessions bring happiness). 
75 Cf. McGarity, supra note 22, at 49 (pointing out that taking the richer is safer idea seriously “would give 
new meaning to the complaint:  ‘These taxes are killing me’”) 
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The problem with Masur and Posner’s argument is that they simply take no 
position on whether the distribution of cost or job loss in particular should matter, at least 
not in this piece.  Saying distribution does not matter is arbitrary, given some of the ways 
distribution can render costs of trivial significance to people’s lives or concentrate costs’ 
effects to deprive people of something as central to well-being as gainful employment.   
 
So much for the argument that feasibility analysis lacks some normative support.   
 
Amazingly, Against Feasibility Analysis tries to disassociate plant closure from 
job loss.  Masur and Posner point out that plant closure may not track job loss, because 
an employer might transfer workers when a plant shuts down.  They argue, therefore, 
that rather than tracking shutdowns, agencies should count job loss “directly.”  Their 
transfer argument applies to any job loss, not just to those associated with plant closure; 
a firm can transfer a fired worker at a still running plant.  And it’s a very weak argument.  
Plant closures do cause job losses, accounting for nearly half of all displacement of long-
term employees in recent years.76  Masur and Posner do not show that job transfers occur 
often; transfers cannot help workers who cannot or will not move; and they would prove 
exceedingly difficult to predict.  Any consequence of regulation might not occur because 
of some deus ex machina, but if we are to engage in any analysis of welfare effects at all 
we must distinguish from likely and unlikely palliatives. The argument for measuring 
jobs directly proves extremely misleading.  Any agency measuring job loss “directly” 
would include an analysis of whether the costs imposed would lead to plant closures, as 
feasibility analysis demands.  Agencies do this all of the time with bankruptcy models 
and other tools, as Masur and Posner acknowledge.77  Messy as it may be, no more direct 
way of analyzing the question of whether plant closures leading to unemployment might 
occur exists.   
 
Masur and Posner stand on more solid ground when they point out that some job 
loss can occur outside the context of plant closures.78  Agencies’ tools for predicting 
these job losses, however, are no more direct and more error prone than their tools for 
predicting plant closures.  They involve figuring out whether cost increases would lead 
to consumers simply paying higher prices or instead whether price rises would instead 
reduce consumption.  If raising prices would reduce consumption, modelers sometimes 
predict that regulated firms would fire workers, but they might instead reduce wages, 
reduce profits, lower benefits, or lower dividends to shareholders.  Although predicting 
job loss through plant closures is not completely reliable either, it is a much safer bet that 
if costs bankrupt an owner or make facilities unprofitable, plants will close. 
 
                                                 
76 See Bureau of Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Worker 
Displacement 2005-2007 (2008) , http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/disp.pdf. (plant closure produced 
45.3% of all job loss);  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Worker Displacement 2003-2005 (2006), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/disp_08172006.pdf (plant closure produced 49% of all job loss); 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Worker Displacement 2001-2003 (2004), http://www.bls.gov/news.release 
/archives/disp_07302004.pdf (plant closure produced 43% of all job loss). 
77 See, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 685 (describing agency employment of a bankruptcy model). 
78 See id. at 703 (noting that job losses can occur without plant closings). 
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A combination of practical and theoretical considerations can justify a focus on 
shutdowns.  First, it might make sense to focus on the most predictable job losses, those 
likely to occur when plants shut down.  Second, plant shutdowns are much more likely to 
cause widespread job losses than measures that do not shutdown plants.  Third, 
widespread plant shutdowns are much more likely to produce permanent unemployment 
in a significant number of cases, since subsequently increasing production at an open 
facility that has terminated some employees is much easier than starting a new plant once 
one has shut down the old one.  Fourth, industry predicts job losses all the time, yet they 
rarely materialize.79  Their lobbying on this politically sensitive point produces great 
potential for agency error, especially as the industry controls much of the relevant 
information about cost, market structure, substitute products and so on.  Confining 
agencies to feasibility analysis, at least for regulations governed by the feasibility 
principle, may reduce error costs. 
 
In any event, Masur and Posner’s observation that feasibility analysis is 
underinclusive with respect to job loss does not justify rejecting feasibility analysis, it 
only justifies supplementing it with efforts to predict job losses outside the shutdown 
context.  In practice, agencies usually estimate both types of job loss and take them into 
account in promulgating technology-based regulations.   
 
Nor can the underinclusiveness argument help justify their preferred alternative, 
CBA.80  CBA is likewise underinclusive, and in a more significant way.  It has no way of 
counting job loss’ impact on welfare, because factors such as affiliation and a feeling of 
control over one’s environment defy quantification.  Also, on the benefits side, CBA 
tends to overlook the many significant health and environmental benefits that scientists 
cannot quantify.  In short the underinclusion argument does not provide an argument for 
choosing CBA over feasibility analysis, but an argument, and not an airtight one, for a 
modification of the feasibility principle to make it conform better to agency practice.    
 
 This argument hopefully has already suggested a broader point about regulatory 
reform.  No magic numbers offer an escape from difficult normative judgments.81 
 
III.  Technical and Practical Comparison 
 
This section will look at some of the technical and practical flaws Masur and 
Posner see in feasibility analysis.  It will show that CBA suffers from the same problems.  
Hence, the differences in our normative judgments seem to relate more to how seriously 
we take distributional concerns than to technique.     
 
A.  Clarity of Guidance 
                                                 
79 See Morgenstern, supra note 66, at 412 (describing industry claims of regulations reducing employment 
as a “mantra” and arguing that the data generally do not support these claims). 
80 Throughout their article, they compare feasibility to CBA and find feasibility wanting.  At one point, they 
disclaim a goal of defending CBA, only to go on in same paragraph to defend CBA as consistent with “a 
range of reasonable conceptions of well-being.”  Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 709.  
81 See generally DOUGLAS KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH 
FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010) (faulting CBA for pushing normative engagement to the side). 
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Masur and Posner, to their credit, recognize that CBA suffers from some 
vagueness and ambiguity.82  But they assume that feasibility analysis provides “no 
theoretical way” to determine the correct balance and CBA does.83  No form of analysis 
provides a “theoretical way” to determine balances.  Normative criteria sometimes 
associated with various forms of analysis, however, may do that.   Their argument’s 
proper target, therefore, is not feasibility analysis, but the feasibility principle.  Their 
implicit claim that the feasibility principle provides less guidance than CBA appears 
baffling given the vagueness of their normative commitments.   
 
 The feasibility principle demands maximization of environmental and health 
benefits up to the point where plant closings begin to occur.  Masur and Posner may not 
like this criterion, but it’s quite clear in principle about the level of stringency required in 
the many cases where contemplated technologies do not lead to any shut downs of 
facilities at all.84  They make this clarity appear to disappear by selecting cases for study 
where agencies predict some plant closures.85  This selection works well as a method for 
highlighting the feasibility principle’s weaknesses in hard cases, thereby facilitating a 
normative debate, but it does slight its capacity to resolve many cases with relative ease.     
 
 I admitted in feasibility that the admonishment to avoid “widespread plant” 
shutdowns required some interpretation when agencies predict some plant closures.  But 
they acknowledge that all verbal formulas are a little vague, including those associated 
with CBA.86   
 
 To make the strongest possible case for CBA’s relative clarity, assume that Masur 
and Posner adopt the efficiency criterion, costs should equal benefits at the margin.  This 
criterion, although not clear in practice (as we shall see), is very clear in theory.  It 
achieves this clarity by leaving out all consideration of distributional equity, in other 
words, through very significant neglect of important aspects of overall well-being, Masur 
and Posner’s normative touchstone.  To achieve a comparable degree of precision, one 
would have to translate the “widespread plant” shutdowns into a similar mathematical 
expression, for example, permitting no more than 10% of plants to shutdown.  Although 
Masur and Posner condemn this rule as arbitrary, it does not seem any more arbitrary 
than decisions establishing a speed limit at 55 miles per hour instead of 65 miles per 
hour.  Legislative decision-making establishing clear rules probably requires some fairly 
arbitrary judgments.  This relates to a larger point suggested at the outset, any clear rule 
will fit some cases poorly, as the poor fit between the rule that costs should not exceed 
benefits and my first television example (minor price rises in a lot of sets) illustrates.  
But if clear guidance is a paramount consideration, one can obtain that by refining, rather 
than abandoning, the feasibility principle.   
                                                 
82 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 705 (describing CBA as using “vague terms’ and requiring 
“relatively arbitrary” choices). 
83 See id. at 705-06. 
84 See Driesen, supra note 5, at 43 (pointing out that often agencies predict no plant closures). 
85 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 670-87 (providing a case study of OSHA’s regulation of hexavalent 
chromium and EPA’s regulation of pollution from pulp and paper plants) 
86 See id. at 705. 
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 They criticize the feasibility principle for failing to tell agencies how far to go.  
But their own examples demonstrate that CBA provides even less guidance, even if one 
employs an “efficiency criterion.”  For example, an exposure limit of 1 ug/m3 for 
hexavalent chrome produces total costs of $552-570 million and a benefits range between 
$53 million and $1.382 billion dollars.87  It is impossible to determine whether this 
regulation equalizes costs and benefits.  Nor for that matter, can one tell whether costs 
exceed benefits or not. The same is true for five of the six regulatory options OSHA 
considered, because all five produce costs within the plausible range of benefits numbers: 
 
OSHA Hexavalent Chromium CBA in Millions of Dollars88 
 
Exposure Limit .25µg/m
3 .5 µg/m3 1 µg/m3 5 µg/m3 10 µg/m3 20 µg/m3 
Monetized 
Benefits 
$60-1,587 $57-1,496 $53-
1,382 
$36-896 $25-584 $13-288 
Costs $1,762-
1,815 
$996-
1,033 
$552-
570 
$273-
282 
$165-170 $109-112 
 
 
No normative criterion associated with CBA tells the regulatory whether to choose .5 
µg/m3, 1 µg/m3 (a limit 2 times as high), 5 µg/m3 (a limit 10 times higher than .5), 10 
µg/m3 (20 times higher than .5), or 20 µg/m3 (40 times .5).89  
 
 OSHA tried to circumvent that difficulty by providing median net benefit 
numbers.90  But in 3 of the 5 cases those medians provide a range of net benefits between 
positive and negative, thus leaving a hapless OSHA, if its statute permitted it to follow 
the efficiency criterion, with a choice between a standard of 1 ug/m3 and limits 10 or 20 
times as lax.91  Even Masur and Posner concede that CBA only narrows the range to a 
choice between levels of 1 µg/m3 and permitting 10 times that amount of exposure.92   
 
Although Masur and Posner bury this fact, OSHA’s completed feasibility analysis 
gave OSHA clear guidance about which level to choose under the feasibility principle.  
                                                 
87 See id. at 673 
88 I derived this Table from Table 1 in Masur and Posner’s article.  See id.  The ranges of values given 
include the difference between assuming a 3% and 7% discount rate.   
89 Indeed, the one option that CBA appears to eliminate, .25 ug/m3, may remain on the table if one either 
uses the proportionality criterion or gives unquantified benefits substantial weight, since on “a plausible set 
of assumptions” costs exceed monetized benefits by just $175 million.  See id. (showing that at a 3% 
discount rate costs are $1,762 and monetized benefit as high as $1,587). 
90 See id.  
91 Moreover, this use of statistics to eliminate some choices is highly suspect.  There is no reason to think 
the median numbers are correct, and in this context medians represent scientific gibberish, because often 
some of the numbers within the range usually have a basis in plausible scientific assumptions, which the 
median does not.  This amounts to an arbitrary preference for the middle.    
92 See id. at 674 (claiming that the “socially optimal exposure limit . . . likely lies somewhere with the range 
of 1 µg/m3 to 10 µg/m3”).  Furthermore, Masur and Posner concede that a .5 µg/m3 limit would be “cost-
benefit justified” under “optimistic assumptions.”  Id.   
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OSHA concluded that at levels more stringent than 5 µg/m3 its regulation would destroy 
at least one industry, but at 5 µg/m3 few if any plant closures would occur.93  Therefore, 
the feasibility principle pointed rather clearly to regulation at 5 µg/m3.  
 
Similarly, the combined costs of the Clean Air and Water Act rule fell within the 
range of plausible benefits for all three options.94  No criterion associated with CBA 
could tell the regulator which option to choose without making a choice among plausible 
benefits estimates or accepting some kind of dubious averaging procedure and then 
ignoring the non-quantified benefits.   
 
This case, however, illustrates something that we all agree on, that the concept of 
widespread plant closure has some ambiguity that will often matter in the minority of 
cases where some plant closure is predicted.  In this case, EPA chose an option with 2 
closures (out of 158 mills regulated) over options generating 4 closures, or 9 closures.95  
Masur and Posner are right to say that this choice required some judgment, and that the 
fact that the job loss numbers increased exponentially if EPA chose the stricter options 
might have been influenced its decision.  One might charitably interpret this as keeping 
norms underlying the feasibility principle in mind as the agency resolves its ambiguities, 
but Masur and Posner reserve that sort of charity for CBA alone.  Of course, if one 
specified a percentage of plant closures in advance, then one would have clear guidance 
available given these facts.    
 
Although Masur and Posner are right that the feasibility principle provides only 
ambiguous guidance in some cases, they fail to recognize that even in their chosen 
examples, narrow CBA provides even less guidance.   The amount of guidance given 
would further diminish if we employed broad CBA and/or more flexible criteria, such as 
the no excess cost criterion Masur and Posner explicitly endorse.     
 
Masur and Posner miss CBA’s lack of ability to provide magic solutions, because 
they delve into the unattractive details of how agencies estimate the numbers for plant 
closures, while applying no scrutiny at all to how they arrive at their estimates of costs 
and benefits, making the numbers in CBA appear magically from nowhere.  They 
acknowledge CBA’s “ambiguities” in the abstract, but blithely assume that agencies 
keeping the overall goal of promotion of public well-being in mind can somehow resolve 
these.96   First of all, overall well-being does nothing to resolve the risk assessment 
problems generating potentially huge variability in benefits estimates.  And they have no 
plausible explanation as to how this goal can guide the agencies with respect to the many 
choices that these rules illustrate remained for agency resolution, even assuming that all 
the numbers are reasonably accurate (a very heroic assumption).  One would think that 
                                                 
93 See id. at 680 (indicating that OSHA abandoned the 1 µg/m3 limit because “feasibility analysis indicated” 
that this level threatened the survival of “at least one industry.”). 
94 See id. at 684. 
95 See id. at 686.  These figures are for rules like the one ultimately promulgated, which regulated both air 
and water pollution. 
96 Id. at 705. 
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people with varying normative commitments might have different views of overall well-
being, even if they all accept Posner and Adler’s description of it.   
 
B.   Generating Numbers for Feasibility Analysis:  A Comparative Approach 
 
Any case of legislative rulemaking will demand tough judgment calls and 
therefore produce less than completely satisfactory reasoning, regardless of the type of 
analysis employed.  The pragmatic question though is not whether feasibility analysis is 
perfect, it is whether it presents more or less difficulty than an available alternative, like 
CBA.   
 
It should be obvious that broad CBA is more complicated and difficult than 
feasibility analysis.  Broad CBA includes a feasibility analysis, analysis of other costs, 
and quantification of benefits.  Feasibility analysis simply requires analysis of costs, the 
number of plant closures, and the number of plants regulated.   
 
To make their case for CBA’s superiority to feasibility analysis in reducing the 
need for arbitrary technical judgments and presenting intractable difficulties even 
colorable, one must assume that they mean to focus only on narrow CBA, quantifying the 
costs and benefits without analyzing job loss.  But alas, even this effort to help their case 
proves unavailing, for CBA still replicates, rather than circumvents, the key difficulties 
they see in feasibility analysis.   
 
1. Industry Definition 
 
Masur and Posner point out that agencies must define the industry in order to 
carry out a feasibility analysis.97  And an analyst can subdivide any industry into 
subcategories.98  The definition of the industry can influence conclusions about whether 
an industry faces widespread plant shutdowns, since the determination of widespread 
plant closures depends on a comparison of the number of plant shutdowns to the number 
of plants in an industry.  Therefore, Masur and Posner claim that agencies “tinker[] with 
industry classifications on an ad hoc basis.”99  The court reviewing the hexavalent 
chrome rule they use to illustrate this problem held that OSHA’s industry classification 
was not arbitrary, partly because of a consistent practice of setting a uniform permitted 
exposure level for the entire regulated universe as a whole, rather than subdividing 
industry.100 Still, Masur and Posner are correct that the agency has discretion in defining 
an industry, so that ad hoc industry definition in theory can occur.101     
                                                 
97 Id. at 688. 
98 Id. at 689 (noting that an “industry can be subdivided indefinitely”). 
99 Id. at 691.  
100 See Public Citizen Health Research v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 182-84 (3rd Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting environmentalist plea to subdivide industry in part because of consistent use of uniform 
standards).  Cf. Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 24 n. 122 (citing OSHA’s use of groups using control 
technologies for the hexavalent chrome rule as an example of “ad hoc” industry definition).   
101 See Public Citizen, 557 F.3d at 183 (declaring OSHA’s decision to use a uniform standard rather than 
tailoring it to particular industries or sub-industries is a “legislative policy decision” that the court will 
uphold if it is “reasonably drawn from the record.”) 
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But the problem of industry classification influencing results and therefore 
inducing tinkering exists with CBA as well. A good example of this problem comes from 
the 5th Circuit’s decision overturning EPA’s phase-out of asbestos in Corrosion Proof 
Fitting v. EPA.102  In its introduction to the case, the court explains that the rule will save 
between 202 and 148 lives at $450-800 million, about $2 to $4 million per life, putting it 
within the range most CBA proponents find acceptable.103  Yet, in explaining why the 
rule is “arbitrary and capricious,” the court accuses EPA of spending $43-76 million per 
life saved.104  What happened?  The introduction refers to the entire industry making 
asbestos products,105 while the passage claiming excessive costs focuses on a subcategory 
of that industry, the manufacturers of asbestos pipe106.  In other words, the results of CBA 
hinge upon the definition of the industry under analysis.  Although Corrosion Proof 
Fittings involves judicial ad hoc tinkering, agencies can do the same under CBA.   
 
2.  Existing versus Future Technology 
 
 Similarly, the problem of having to decide whether to base a rule on existing 
technology or on technology not yet fully developed arises for any analysis of cost, not 
just for feasibility analysis.  The cost of meeting any level of environmental protection 
equals the cost of making the technological changes (broadly defined) needed to meet 
that level.107  A good example of the problem of CBA varying depending upon whether 
one embraces technology forcing or not comes from the CBA of climate disruption. 
Different analysts come up with widely varying conclusions about the costs of abating 
greenhouse gas emissions.108 One of the most significant causes of these disparities in 
CBA’s results arises from choices about how to treat the possibility of technological 
advancement. 109 Some analysts base their cost estimates on existing technologies or past 
experience, whilst others come to very different conclusions because they assume that 
abatement policies will produce technological advances lowering costs.110   
 
                                                 
102 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
103 Id. at 1208. 
104 See id. at 1219 (noting parenthetically that $128-227 million of contemplated compliance expenditures 
to save three lives implies $43-76 million per life saved). 
105  Id. at 1207-08 (associating the $2-4 million per life saved figure with EPA’s “rule” phasing out “most 
asbestos-containing products”). 
106 Id. at 1219 (associating the $43-76 million per life saved figure with EPA’s “ban of asbestos pipe”). 
107 See Driesen, supra note 5, at 11.  See, e.g., Posner, supra note 25, at 1145  (noting that mark data on 
scrubbers costs would be used to estimate the costs of regulations dependent on scrubber technology). 
108 See Terry Barker et al., Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change by Inducing Technological Progress:  
Scenarios Using a Large-Scale Econometric Model, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 362-64 
(Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al. eds. 2006) (discussing the wide divergence in abatement cost estimates 
in economic models of climate change). 
109 See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE STERN REVIEW 262 (2006)  (pointing 
out that innovation rates “make a large difference” in cost estimation).  
110 See, e.g., Patrick Matschoss & Heinz Welsch, International Emissions Trading and Induced Carbon-
Saving Technological Change:  Effects of Restricting the Trade in Carbon Rights, 33 ENVTL. & RESOURCE 
ECON. 169 (2006). 
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Masur and Posner point out that courts have placed a heavy burden on agencies 
trying to justify technology forcing regulation, thereby making it difficult to use 
feasibility analysis to advance technology.111  There is no reason to expect CBA to lead to 
abatement of this problem.  Indeed, by emphasizing the notion that all regulation must be 
cost justified CBA, if subject to judicial review, will likely exacerbate judicial tendencies 
to expect a better justification than agencies can produce for reliance on future 
technologies.  It will no longer be enough to show that reasons exist to expect the 
technology to be technically feasible and not so expensive as to bankrupt anybody.  
Instead, the agency would have to show that it has a reasonable basis for estimating the 
precise cost, a difficult task with a technology not yet developed.      
   
3.  Path Dependence and Time Inconsistency 
 
 Masur and Posner show that “path dependence” and “time inconsistency” cause 
feasibility analysis’ results to depend on agencies’ prior regulatory actions with respect to 
the regulated industry.112  This means that a regulation’s viability might depend on when 
the agency chooses to promulgate it.  In CBA, this path dependence problem usually 
becomes broader, as regulations’ acceptability can become dependent not just on the 
timing of regulation for a particular industry, but on all regulation influencing the 
environmental conditions that the regulation under analysis addresses.  A good example 
of this comes from the Clean Water Act, which aims to restore heavily damaged 
ecosystems through a program of regulating water intake from large industrial facilities 
and effluent.  The water intake kills billions fish and other aquatic organisms, thereby 
harming ecosystems.113  Suppose that EPA regulates water intake early in the Clean 
Water Act’s life, when aquatic ecosystems are seriously degraded.  The proposed 
regulation costs $100 million and, because a degraded ecosystem currently supports little 
aquatic life, saves only 5 million fish, each fish worth $10.00.  This $50 million dollar 
benefit cannot justify the $100 million cost.  So, CBA (or more precisely, the no excess 
cost criterion) would prohibit regulation, precisely because of ecosystem degradation, 
which one might otherwise treat as an indication of a need for aggressive regulation 
aimed at ecological recovery.  Suppose now that EPA proposes the same $100 million 
regulation after twenty years of successful regulation of effluent.  Now thriving aquatic 
ecosystems make regulation less important.   But the thriving ecosystem has boosted the 
commercial fish population so that water intake now kills 20 million fish, worth $200 
million.  Because the agency promulgates this regulation after other regulations, its 
benefits justify the cost.  CBA not only proves path dependent and time inconsistent, but, 
at times, utterly perverse from the standpoint of key environmental values.114   
 
                                                 
111 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 691-92 (noting that although “some commentators believe that 
agencies may issue technology-forcing regulations,” agencies rarely issue them” because of burdens 
imposed by the courts). 
112 See id. at 696-97. 
113 69 Fed. Reg. 41,575, 41,586 (July 9, 2004) (estimating water intakes kill at 3.4 billion aquatic organisms 
per year). 
114 See Douglas A. Kysar, Fish Tales, in  REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS  209 (Winston 
Harrington et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter RIA]. 
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 Moreover, this sort of path dependence invites ad hoc tinkering in the analysis 
itself.  A good example comes from EPA’s recent regulation of mercury emissions from 
power plants.  Since the technologies used to reduce mercury from power plants also 
reduce particulate, which is associated with tens of thousands of annual deaths, a 
promptly implemented mercury rule evaluated on its own would likely produce enormous 
benefit predictions.115  Since the Bush Administration EPA chose to implement a rule 
aimed at particulate and other criteria pollutants before the mercury rule,116 its assessment 
of the mercury rule’s benefits counted only the incremental mercury benefits realized 
after the criteria pollutant rule was implemented.117  Hence, the agency, by manipulating 
the timing of the regulation, could manipulate the outcome of the CBA.  The CBA of the 
mercury rule exhibits temporal inconsistency and path dependence,118 illustrating that yet 
another problem Masur and Posner imagine arising under feasibility has arisen under 
CBA.   
 
 Masur and Posner complain that agencies use feasibility analysis in an ad hoc 
manner.119  They admit that agency uses of CBA are “not perfect, either.”120 The 
literature they cite to justify this modest concession includes the mercury and water 
intake examples above and shows that agencies use CBA in an ad hoc manner as well.121  
And the unavoidable problems they find in feasibility analysis generally exist even for 
narrow CBA.  CBA multiplies the number of variables contained in the analysis, which 
multiplies opportunities for ad hoc judgment. All analysis offers opportunities for ad hoc 
judgment, but feasibility analysis lessens the number of opportunities provided. 
 
C. Decision-Making Costs:  CBA and Feasibility Compared 
  
Masur and Posner blithely assure us that CBA minimizes “decision-making costs 
through the magic of quantification,” thereby suggesting that it has lower costs than 
feasibility analysis.122  But CBA requires analysis of technology and its costs, just as 
feasibility analysis does.  And CBA requires very difficult quantification of 
environmental harms, something that feasibility analysis does not require.  Since the 
outcome of CBA depends on the choice of which benefits to quantify and what values to 
attach to them, these variables regularly become matters of dispute between the Office of 
Management and Budget and EPA, often leading costly interagency debates and delays.  
If the cost of conducting and debating analysis is part of decision-making (and it’s hard to 
see how it could not be), then CBA maximizes decision costs.   
                                                 
115 See Catherine A. O’Neill, The Mathematics of Mercury, in RIA, supra note 109, at 115 (describing a 
promptly implemented mercury rule as generating particulate “co-benefits”). 
116 Id. at 111 (describing the timing of the mercury rule). 
117 Id. at 113 (stating that this approach allowed EPA to avoid attributing “a sizeable category of benefits” 
to the mercury rule).   
118 See Alan J. Krupnick, The CAMR:  An Economist’s Perspective, in RIA, supra note 109, at 144-145 
(agreeing that the choice of timing influenced the baseline and therefore the estimates of costs and 
benefits). 
119 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 706. 
120 Id.  
121 See RIA, supra note 109. 
122 Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 700.  Cf. id. at 701 (recognizing the feasibility analysis has the 
advantage of not requiring quantification of benefits). 
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Perhaps Masur and Posner have in mind the costs of making decisions after the 
government has completed and agreed upon an analysis under the efficiency criterion, 
which after all, takes the form of a mathematical equation.  Even then, however, it 
remains hard to see how CBA “minimizes” decision costs.  As Masur and Posner’s case 
studies illustrate, the agency must always decide upon the weight to be given non-
quantifiable environmental benefits, since some significant benefits always defy 
quantification.123  If the CBA is scientifically honest, then they must also debate which 
points in the various overlapping quantified benefit ranges to choose, as previously 
shown.124   
 
By contrast, the feasibility principle makes many decisions easy once the analysis 
is complete, because, many regulations produce no plant closures.  Under those 
circumstances agencies just choose the most stringent technological option.  Of course, 
things get dicier, as they point out, when agencies predict some plant closures. But they 
have not begun to support the notion that choosing a point at which plant closures are 
widespread is harder than choosing which regulation maximizes net benefits when the 
wide range of benefits estimates and the nonquantifiables are considered.     
 
Masur and Posner concede that it might make sense to eschew CBA if it 
exacerbates any agency tendencies to under-regulate, but suggest that we need a great 
deal of “empirical work” to overcome “one’s natural skepticism” about the idea that CBA 
constitutes a drag on regulation.125  In saying this, they fail to engage an enormous 
scholarly literature, including some by CBA proponents, showing that OMB has used 
CBA to slow and throttle rules in every administration and that the processes involved 
have killed off at least one entire regulatory program and slowed others down 
enormously.126  Do they have some empirical evidence to refute scholars’ assertions after 
a judicial decision demanding CBA of every option in a section 6 rulemaking under the 
Toxics Substances Control Act EPA gave up any substantial use of section 6, the 
principle regulatory authority EPA has for limiting the use of toxic substances?127  Do 
they seriously doubt the assertion that quantitative risk assessment, a procedure at the 
                                                 
123 Cf. Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 
1556-60 (2009) (showing that valuation of biodiversity losses from climate change have been left out of 
most economic models and are deeply problematic in the models that attempt it).     
124 See, e.g., id. at 1548 (pointing out that estimates of GDP losses range from 0-3% of GDP when global 
temperatures rise between 2 and 3º, but that the losses rise to 5-10% of GDP if temperatures are assumed to 
increase by 5-6º C).  
125 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 711. 
126 See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:  HOW COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 11, 151-61 (reviewing CBA’s role 
in slowing, defeating, and weakening rules and concluding that it “generally serves an anti-regulatory 
purpose,” but supporting it with reforms designed to overcome this problem) 
127 See David M. Driesen, supra note 29, at 347 (pointing out that EPA has not banned a single chemical 
since the Fifth Circuit subjected such actions to ac cost-benefit test); Thomas O. McGarity, Professor 
Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L. J. 2341, 2342 (2002) (describing CBA as having “throttled” regulation 
under TSCA & FIFRA).  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA 199 (Richard Morgenstern ed. 1997) (describing 
the regulation of PCBs as the only action EPA ever took under TSCA § 6 in the wake of the Corrosion 
Proof Fittings decision).  But PCB’s were banned long before then.   
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heart of CBA, doomed EPA’s pesticide program to a state of perpetual slow motion?128  
Do they doubt leading scholars’ assertions that linking specific reductions of pollutants to 
specific results in the receiving medium, which CBA requires, has never worked well in 
any medium, land, air, and water?129  We do not know, because Masur and Posner have 
substituted their “natural skepticism” of the idea that a comprehensive quantitative 
analysis of all regulatory consequences might create serious burdens on regulatory 
programs for serious engagement with a consensus view of most of the countries’ leading 
environmental law scholars.  Although my work has distinctively emphasized a 
normative justification for the feasibility principle, a large literature mostly preceding my 
work has supported feasibility analysis as necessary to avoid the well-known decision-
making costs that CBA and quantitative risk assessment create.130   
 
IV.    Two Cheers or Three?   
 
 The foregoing establishes the following points: 
 
1) Important normative values support feasibility analysis’ focus on plant closures;  
2)  Broad CBA requires, rather than avoids, feasibility analysis; 
3)  Narrow CBA arbitrarily ignores very important distributional consequences;   
4)  CBA generates much greater decision costs and more opportunities for ad hoc 
judgment than feasibility analysis;   
5)  The feasibility principle is extremely likely to generate the proper result in the many 
cases where no technological option leads to plant closures, because those cases generally 
distribute costs so widely among consumers that they have no significant impact on well-
being.   
 
Yet, a decision about whether to allow a large number of plant closures for the 
sake of preventing a cancer death (or similarly serious consequences) remains difficult in 
the few cases where the agency predicts some plant closures.  Masur and Posner correctly 
suggest that the concentration principle I developed in Feasibility (opposing foregoing 
widely disbursed costs to address concentrated harms devastating individuals) does not 
                                                 
128 See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of 
Federal Regulatory Reform, 10 YALE J. REG. 369, 437 (1993) 
129 See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 136, 165, 194–97 (2d ed. 2002) (making this assertion and providing examples); Adam 
Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 133–35 (2003) (finding 
that “[t]he most common criticism of risk-based standards is that they do not work,” and providing 
examples of where they failed); see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042–43 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (recognizing that Congress adopted a technology-based approach in 1972 in reaction to the failed 
effort to “use receiving water quality as a basis for setting effluent pollution standards”); cf. Amy Sinden, 
In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 
1487–88 (2005) (arguing that the strict effects-based approach in the Endangered Species Act produces 
results “closer to where we want to be” than a balancing approach would).  
130 See, e.g., Babich, supra note 124; Houck, supra note 124; Wendy Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-
Based Standard Setting, 2000 U. ILLINOIS L. REV. 83; Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So 
Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729; Christopher H. 
Schroeder, In The Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If Feasibility Analysis is the Answer, What is the 
Question?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (1990).  
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justify a choice between avoiding widespread plant closures and fully protecting life or 
health.131  That decision remains difficult.   
 
 For that reason, I specifically avoided making the claim that the “feasibility 
principle offers a perfect ideal for regulation.”132  Instead, I argued that the principle 
represents a “reasonable Congressional judgment about how agencies should address the 
cost of environmental regulation.”133   I shared Masur and Posner’s concern that under 
this principle agencies might sometimes allow extremely harmful substances to go 
underregulated, but pointed out that “Congress . . . may choose more demanding 
requirements for particular substances than the feasibility principle might induce.”134    
That is a major reason why I only muster “two cheers” for the feasibility principle, not 
three.  Yet, the alternative they offer, CBA, does not merit even two cheers.  
 
Narrow CBA fails to give any weight to the concentrated harms plant closures 
produce.  For that reason, it is normatively unacceptable and lacks a strong connection to 
overall well-being.   
 
 If Masur and Posner would like to argue for broad CBA then they would have to 
abandon their opposition to feasibility analysis and admit that they endorse it with all of 
its technical difficulties.  “Against Feasibility Analysis” would become “Three Cheers for 
Feasibility Analysis/Against the Feasibility Principle.” 
 
 But calling for increasing the scope of analysis does not resolve the normative 
conundrum about what to do about a situation presenting a tradeoff between life and 
health on the one hand and the large numbers of job losses associated with widespread 
plant closures on the other.  Take my opening hypothetical, one painful cancer death 
versus 10,000 permanent job losses.  Masur and Posner have not shown what resolution 
the concept of overall well-being points to in this case.  That concept represents a very 
carefully thought out abstract philosophical position, but I do not see how it is capable of 
providing an uncontroversial answer to a question like this.   
 
 An analyst employing CBA would choose a dollar value for the death and the lost 
wages involved in the job losses, thereby ignoring the pain involved in the cancer death 
and the emotional damages inflicted through the job loss.  But putting dollar values upon 
consequences disguises normative judgments, rather than avoids them.  Standard 
economic methods ask what would a worker be willing to pay to avoid a risk of death, 
generating a wide range of values.135  Still, the numbers government agencies use 
generally represent averages lumping together disparate studies, most of them outdated, 
of different populations.136  If they used wage premium studies of non-unionized workers, 
they could justify dropping this number to $2.6 million, and if they relied upon studies of 
                                                 
131 See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 703. 
132 See Driesen, supra note 1, at 47. 
133 Id. (emphasis added). 
134 Id. at 47-48. 
135 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27, at 79. 
136 ID. at 81-83.  
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unionized female workers they could justify raising the value to $42.3 million.137  The 
choice about what dollar value to assign to a human life depends upon a value judgment, 
even if one takes standard economic methodologies as a given.     
 
 But if one employed a different premise in the valuation, say assuming that the 
person about to die of cancer from an unregulated hazard knows who she is and would be 
asked how much money she is willing to accept in order to consent to her own painful 
death, the answer may be she is not willing to die for any price.  This would justify a 
conclusion that life has infinite value.  In other words, a different, albeit unconventional, 
methodological choice in CBA could justify a wholly health protective outcome, 
although another choice might demand that one reject a regulation saving her.  So, 
putting a dollar value on each consequence takes normative choices away from 
democratic processes and gives them to economists pretending not to make them while 
devaluing everything defying quantification.  Dollar values paper over, rather than 
resolve, normative dilemmas.   
 
 This raises the possibility that maybe even the feasibility principle, with all of its 
imperfections, deserves three cheers.  It is reasonable to say that generally we value 
protecting people’s lives, their health, and their environment over minor and often 
temporary price changes, but when health and environmental protection causes many 
more people to risk financial and emotional devastation through job loss, we hesitate.  
We recognize that the tradeoffs in that case are difficult enough that we may not be 
comfortable delegating them to agencies without some default, bearing in mind that 
Congress might have to make a contrary choice directly.  So, we direct agencies to 
presume that widespread plant shutdowns are not acceptable.   
 
 The feasibility principle at least provides evidence of sensible normative 
engagement in the relevant questions and a democratic legislative decision about how to 
presumptively resolve them.  Congress decided to allow some plant closures to occur as 
part of the price we must pay to deal with serious environmental problems, but often 
created a presumption against widespread plant closures.138  Civic debate should help 
formulate and articulate public values and decisions about how and whether to balance 
them.139 One can see the feasibility principle’s presence in numerous statutes as an 
articulation of public values favoring public health and environmental protection, but 
expressing concern about job loss.  It may be appropriate for a democracy to develop and 
                                                 
137 See ID. at 79. 
138 CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 93d Cong., 1stSess., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 170 (EPA need not determine economic impact of a plant upon a 
single community or plant) (Comm. Print 1973); Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 818 (Congress contemplated 
the closure of some marginal plants under BAT standards); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 
U.S. 112, 127 n. 17 (1977) (effluent limitations under section 301(b) of the Clean Water Act may go 
beyond limits within an individual owner=s economic capability); Industrial Union Dep=t, AFL-CIO v. 
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Occupational Safety and Health Act does not Aguarantee the 
existence of individual employers@); United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (showing of technological infeasibility for a few operators will not defeat a standard). 
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embody public values in law, rather than to pretend that the “magic of quantification” 
obviates the need for value choices.   
       
Conclusion 
 
 Against Feasibility Analysis assumes what it sets out to prove when it sets up the 
efficiency criterion as the implicit baseline for measuring under and over-regulation.  The 
feasibility principle has a good, albeit imperfect, normative justification and a very good 
institutional justification.  Masur and Posner show that feasibility raises some difficult 
practical issues, but fail to acknowledge that CBA confronts the same difficulties, in 
addition to the more familiar problem of benefits that defy reasonably reliable 
quantification.  Although one might wish for a clearer normative position from them, 
especially respecting cost-benefit criteria and the importance of distributional 
consequences, they deserve credit for diving into the details of some real regulations and 
deepening a continuing dialogue over the relative merits of both competing normative 
values and forms of analysis.   
    
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
139 My thanks to Douglas Kysar for suggesting some emphasis on the role of articulating public values. 
